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Export Promoting Development Strategies
There is a widely held view that international
trade has servedas an engineof growth for the
majority of newly emerging industrialized
countries over the past three decades. In
particular, countries such as South Korea and
Brazil seem to have had particular success with
export promotion development strategies as
opposed to import-substitution strategies (which
are designed to encourage domestic production
as substitutes for imports).
Support for export promotion policies is not
universal, however, and indeed there remains
some dispute over the empirical record
apparently indicating their success. This Letter
critically reviews the basic theoretical and
empirical arguments put forward in support of
export promotion development strategies. We
conclude that export promotion policies are
probably most effective when they are imbed-
ded in a broader policy of liberalization
designed to open an economy to international
trade and to increase the importance of the
market mechanism.
Supporting arguments
An export-oriented policy, as distinct from a
market-oriented policy, indicates a policy bias
toward promotion of the export sector at the
expense of other sectors of the economy. In this
development strategy, a government plays a
major role in setting export production goals and
implements policies designed to achieve those
goals. The spectrum of export-oriented policies
ranges from uniform export subsidies to
industrial policies that set sectoral priorities for
investment, credit, foreign exchange, and so on,
all of which aim to make the structure of
production conform to the export strategy.
Numerous arguments have been made for why
an explicitly export-oriented policy bias is likely
to spur rapid economic development. They
include economies of scale (lower unit costs)
when expansion into foreign markets allows
longer production runs, easing of foreign
exchange constraints (and the ability to buy
imports essential to domestic production
processes) by the sale of exports, greater
incentives for technological improvements and
more efficient management techniques due to
competitive pressures encountered on- foreign
markets, and better sectoral allocation of
resources.
These arguments suggest that the benefits of
export-oriented growth policies work through
two basic channels: (1) greater productivity
gains in the export sector as compared to the
nonexport sector and (2) spillover effects, or
externalities, from the export sector to the
nonexport sector.
The first channel is operative if the productivity
of resources devoted to the export sector were
greater than that of resources devoted to the
nonexport sector. In a competitive economy,
one would expect the market and price mecha-
nism to work toward eliminating existing
productivity differentials. That is, one would
expect entrepreneurs in the normal course of
investment decisions and without government
incentives to devote additional resources to the
sector where they anticipate the greatest
productivity differential, and can tap the largest
profit potential. For this reason, the argument for
intersectoral productivity differentials is usually
combined with the assertion of market failure,
i.e., with a reason private business is not already
investing optimally in response to existing profit
opportunities.
The externality channel is operative when
increasing output in the export sector leads to a
rise in nonexport output even when the resource
commitment in that sector is unchanged.
Economists term the rise in nonexport output an
"externality" effect because the production
increase is associated with factors outside, or .
external to, the normal process of production in
the nonexport sector. For example, tech-
nological and managerial improvementsFR8SF
associated with increasing resources devoted to
the export sector may spill over ioto the
nonexport sector and raise output there as well.
Export-oriented policies operating through
externalities may be optimal even when market
forces are functioning perfectly well. Market
forces alone would t~nd not toexpand the
export sector to the socially optimal size
because some of the benefits from additional
investments would flow to other sectors and
could not be fully captured by firms engaged in
export production. In fact, the existence of
externality effects is a classic case given by
economists in support of interventionist
government policies.
Evidence: pro
The conventional wisdom supporting export
promotion policies is based less on theoretical
analysis than on empirical evidence gleaned
from a number of in-depth studies of individual
countries and several extensive cross-country
studies. These studies have indicated that
developing countries with favorable export
growth have tended to experience higher rates
of growth of national income.Since exports are
a component of aggregate output, one would
expect this positive correlation, but a number of
studies also have.found thatexports contribute
more to GNP growth than just an increase in
exports.
An importantproject of the National Bureau of
Economic Research (NBER) identified two key
examples of nationsthat have at different times
aggressively pursued export-promotion
development strategies: South Korea and Brazil.
In the early 1960s, South Korea switched from
import-substitution policies to export-promotion
policies; Brazil made a similar switch in 1968.
As a result, export volume in Korea grew
fourfold between 1963and 1969, almost tenfold
during the 1970s, and almost doubled between
1981 and 198.6. Brazil's export volume
(excluding coffee) more than tripled between
1968 and 1974, and almost doubled between
1975 and 1980.
Both Korea and Brazil altered their economic
systems to provide a bias toward exports, but the
subsequent growth far exceeded expectations.
Korea's average annual real gross national
product (GNP) was 11 percent between 1963
and 1969, 10 percent between 1970 and 1979,
and 71/2 percent between 1981 and 1985 (1980
is omitted due to the political and economic
turmoil in Korea at the time). Brazil's average
annual real GNP growth rate was 10 percent
between 1968 and 1974 and 61 /2 percent
between 1975 and 1980. In the aftermath of the
world recession and international debt problem,
Brazil's real GNP has stumbled along, averaging
only about 1 percent annual growth. The NBER
study suggested that both countries' economic
performance up until the latter 1970s improved
by considerably more than the direct
contribution of the increase in exports.
Beyond individual case studies, several broad
empirical studies investigating the average asso-
ciation between the growth of exports and the
growth of GNP across developing countries over
time periods spanning several decades (cross-
section studies) have unambiguously supported
the export-promotion hypothesis: those develop-
ing countries with higher than average export
growth over extended periods have also tended
to experience higher than average output
growth.
In one important recently published cross-
sectional study of a large number of semi-
industrialized, less developed countries,
Gershon Feder ofthe World Bank finds that mar-
ginal factor productivity and externality effects
in the export sector are significant. He con-
cludes that growth can be generated not only by
increases in the aggregate levels of labor and
capital, but also by the re-allocation of existing
resources from the less efficient nonexport sector
to the higher productivity export sector. This
basic finding has been confirmed by numerous
other cross-sectional analyses of exports and
growth.
Evidence: con
In sharp contrast to the in-depth individual
country studies and cross-country empirical ana-
lyses, at least two very recent empirical studies
of the causal relation between exports and GNP
growth cast some doubt o.n the efficacy of export
promotion policies.
Jung and Marshall investigated the lead and lag
timing patterns between exports and output
growth for 37 separate developing countries and
found only a few cases where exports clearly"cause" output growth. Most surprising, per-
haps, is that they found little support for the
export promotion hypothesis in those newly
industrialized countries (NICs) that have both
experienced rapid economic growth and been
extremely successful in penetrating world mar-
kets with their exports (e.g., South Korea,
Taiwan; Brazil,andsoon).
Reconciliation
The debate over the optimal set of government
policies to promote economic development will
not be easily resolved, not least because the
empirical validity of the export promotion
hypothesis remains in doubt. At present, the
strong evidence in support of an export-
promotion development strategy offered by
country studies and cross-section comparisons
are discounted by the negative findings of time-
series "causality" work.
What reasonable explanation can reconcile
these apparently contradictory results? The most
obvious potential explanation, of course, is that
the export promotion hypothesis is not strictly
true. Rapid export growth may well be naturally
entangled with the overall development process
when market-oriented liberalization policies are
pursued and the economy becomes more open
to international trade. The empirical evidence
unambiguously supports the view that allowing
market forces and the price system to work pro-
motes economic growth. World Bank studies,
for example, have found that the average output
growth of those developing nations that allowed
market forces to reduce price distortions in the
1970s was about 7 percent a year - or 2 per-
centage points higher than the overall average.
The process of market liberalization would be
typified by the switch from an import-substitu-
tion policy - which has involved a heavily reg-
ulated economy with controls specifically
directed toward slowing imports in an attempt to
promote domestic industry - to a more liberal
trading regime and open economy. Under such
a process, both exports and output would tend
to grow quickly on average - the result noted
in cross-sectional studies - but it would be
inappropriate to infer from this growth a cause
and effect relationship running from exports to
output.
The lack of evidence for a cause and effect rela-
tionship is not really as strong a critique of
export-promotion policies as it may appear. To a
large extent, a shift toward export-promotion
policies has meant, in practice, dismantling an
import-substitution policy bias in the economy.
The result oftentimes has been to move the
economy toward a more "neutral" market-
oriented stance rather than to swing it full circle
toward an export-oriented bias. In this sense,
rapid export growth - as resources move from
import-substituting production to exports -
even ifit is not strictly "causing" a strong output
response, is nonetheless an integral part of the
growth process as the economy responds to a
more balanced development policy.
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BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT
(Dollaramounts·in millions)










Loans, Leases and Investments1 2 209,228 342 3,955 1.9
Loans and Leases1 6 184,602 582 - 50 0.0
Commercial and Industrial 51,463 353 430 0.8
Real estate 72,091 145 5,228 7.8
Loans to Individuals 36,933 - 66 - 4,430 - 10.7
Leases 5,392 - 24 - 151 - 2.7
U.S. Treasury and Agency Securities2 17,364 - 278 4,571 35.7
Other Securities2 7,262 37 - 567 - 7.2
Total Deposits 209,652 4,199 520 0.2
Demand Deposits 54,209 2,870 - 1,152 - 2.0
Demand Deposits Adjusted3 36,551 1,075 - 14,013 - 27.7
OtherTransaction Balances4 20,509 852 2,027 10.9
Total Non-Transaction Balances6 134,934 477 - 355 - 0.2
MoneyMarket Deposit
Accounts-Total 44,198 208 - 2,209 - 4.7
Time Deposits in Amounts of
$100,000ormore 31,832 341 - 1,709 - 5.0
Other Liabilities for Borrowed MoneyS 26,587 140 - 818 - 2.9
Two Week Averages
of Daily Figures
Reserve Position, All Reporting Banks
Excess Reserves (+)/Deficiency(-)
Borrowings











1 Includes loss reserves, unearnedincome, excludes interbank loans
2 Excludes trading accountsecurities
3 Excludes U.S. governmentand depository institution deposits and cash items
4 ATS, NOW, Super NOWand savings accounts with telephone transfers
S Includes borrowingvia FRB, TT&L notes, Fed Funds, RPs and other sources
6 Includes items notshown separately
7 Annualized percent change